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Abstract 
The burgeoning use of artificial intelligence in a learning increasingly mediated through mobile 
technology makes inclusion problematic. This is largely due to the sheer ubiquity of mobile 
technology globally, the complexity of the machine learning regimens needed to function within 
increasingly sophisticated 5G cellular networks, and the legions of professionals needed to initiate 
and maintain these AI and mobile ecosystems. The promise of artificial intelligence in inclusion is 
curtailed precisely due to the accumulated advantage (the Matthew effect) presented in such a 
technological sophistication: only those with the most sophisticated and agile of educational systems 
will stand to benefit, a scenario that poses significant impact on inclusion strategies increasingly 
mediated through ICT.   
 
Further, the accumulated advantage is not only a dichotomy between those with access to these 
sophisticated technologies and those that do not enjoy that same privilege. A further parallel is 
between the “curriculum” of machine learning of artificial intelligence in 5G networks as outlined in 
Li et al (2017) and traditional and human-centred educational curricula that is being increasingly 
redrawn as a reductionist enterprise aligned with national and international quantitative metrics. 
While AI has evolved to include multidisciplinary techniques such as machine learning, optimization 
theory, game theory, control theory, and meta-heuristics in both supervised and unsupervised 
formats, traditional educational curricula is increasingly influenced by third party commercial 
enterprises and reductionist moves towards computational thinking.  
 
This poses significant disadvantage to educational inclusion beyond technological advantage, the 
sophistication of machine learning curricula, or the general paucity of human curricula increasingly 
modeled on computational thinking; the biases at work in larger society are encoded into the 
datasets that machine learning operates. Inclusion operates, statistically, as an outlier in these data-
driven environments; as an equitable model in education, largely designed to counter prevailing 
societal biases, rather than conform to them. The equity that this inclusion seeks to provide is not 
inherently a naturally-occurring entity and will not render naturally in the data that AI is learning 
2 
from. As more and more education is engaged through mobile technology and more and more of 
that mobile education is driven by an artificial intelligence emerging from curricula of greater and 
greater sophistication, a situation emerges that poses great challenges for any sort of meaningful 
inclusion, particularly in the potential acceleration of entrenched advantage.  
Relationality and mobility: Positioning AI in a broader sociocultural 
context 
The futures of artificial intelligence and mobile technology are inexorably linked precisely due to the 
amounts of data generated by the latter being used to fuel the machine learning of the former. 
Mobile web traffic has overtaken desktop and laptop-based in many if not most markets with mobile 
data expected to increase tenfold between 2016-2022 growing at a rate of 45% in that span annually 
(Ericsson 2018); and the number of unique mobile subscribers will reach 5.9 billion by 2025, 
equivalent to 71% of the world’s population (GSMA 2018a). The big data required for machine 
learning to build intelligent models suggests a natural pivot to mobile technology; if the future of 
artificial intelligence needs increasingly more user data to build its intelligence, it must engage in 
mobile, precisely because data is increasingly generated this way and particularly in developing 
contexts. This increase in mobile data has profound implications for education and inclusion.  
 
Indeed, the burgeoning use of artificial intelligence in a learning increasingly mediated through mobile 
technology makes technological inclusion problematic. This is largely due to the sheer ubiquity of 
mobile technology globally, the complexity of the machine learning regimens needed to function 
within increasingly sophisticated 5G cellular networks, and the legions of professionals needed to 
initiate and maintain these AI and mobile ecosystems. The promise of artificial intelligence in 
education is curtailed precisely due to the accumulated advantage presented in such a technological 
sophistication: only those with the most sophisticated and agile of educational systems will stand to 
benefit, a scenario that poses significant impact on inclusion strategies increasingly mediated through 
ICT.  The mobile context for the data that powers AI and the technological space in which much AI 
is deployed (via mobile technology) inherently involves issues of inclusion and exclusion at its onset. 
There are inherent differentiations of these issues surrounding technological access and use 
according to geographical, social, political, and economic. A failure to meaningfully address these 
differentiations will likely entrench existing relations of inclusions and exclusion.   
Mobilities and Education 
Yet the critique of such a system of accumulated advantage, and its potential impact on inclusion in 
education, requires a theoretical a lens which mobility theory graciously provides. Mobilities theory 
is typified by a structural typology consisting of five mobility types: mobility of objects, corporeal 
mobility, imaginative mobility, virtual mobility and communicative mobility (Fortunati and Taipale 
2017). What this chapter is primarily concerned with is virtual mobility, the mobility experienced 
online by internet users; communicative mobility, person-to-person communication modalities 
connected to movement; and the effects of these on imaginative mobilities, the representation of 
mobility as elaborated and broadcasted by the media (2017). It is in the intersection of these three 
mobilities that the use of artificial intelligence in education has the greatest potential impact.  
 
More importantly, mobilities theory is largely non-representational and concerned with the 
relationality of “bodies and objects and conjoined metabolisms of bodies and space, so that the 
pulses and rhythms between them are discernible in the shifting mobilities of urban life” (Lefebvre 
2004). While this chapter is not concerned with the urban of this description, it is concerned with 
the relationality of the movements of educational systems, AI, and people; as such mobilities theory 
presents utility in understanding the “dynamic intersections of people, objects and places, interfaces 




The use of mobilities theory, beyond providing utilitarian value in unpacking the intersectionality that 
AI in education foregrounds, also inherently broadens the theoretical gaze away from a humanist 
assumption, emphasising the material relations that exist between humans and non-humans (Fenwick 
et al 2011), the mobilities that course through these relations, and the new educational spaces 
created as a result.  
 
Traditional educational systems built from a territoriality emerging from the compulsory schooling 
legislation of many countries in the 19th and 20th centuries engendered a particular expectation of 
social mobility. AI supplants aspects of this educational mobility  with potentially dramatic 
consequences. A focus on mobility pushes away from territoriality with a host of attendant and both 
positive and desultory effects. These effects seep into educational systems as we are taken away 
“from such a focus on bounded regions and terrains (the nation, the city, the campus), toward a 
consideration of the new kinds of ‘mobilities and moorings’ (Hannam et al. 2006: 2) experienced in 
contemporary political, economic and social space” (Bayne et al., 2014). AI supplants actors in 
relational educational systems, reconfiguring both the mobilities made possible in this new 
educational space, and introducing “extensive systems of immobility” (Sheller & Urry, 2006, 210) in 
its wake.   
 
Using this mobilities lens with artificial intelligence is necessary precisely because of the significance 
of the departure that AI poses for traditional educational systems, and consequently the potentially 
radical redrawing of the spaces of education created as a result. Emergent technologies such as AI 
‘introduce a significant break in the way individuals, groups and society as a whole conduct their 
everyday activities, as well as add new dimensions to our understanding of the social world’; these 
shifts have cascading “practical and epistemological implications for mobile methods” (Hesse-Biber 
2011: 4). The immobilities posed by this new relationality are both offshoots of the “material 
inequalities in the distribution of communication technologies” (Chouliaraki 2012), discussed further 
in this chapter as an ownership and access inequality, and technological intent; beyond human 
ownership and access of ICT, AI largely assumes no human involvement at all. This poses a scenario 
ripe for accumulated advantage: those with significant access to ICT and sophisticated educational 
systems stand to accumulate advantage by this new relationality. This is positioned in the following 
sections through a discussion of the Matthew effect and its codification of immobility.   
Matthew effect as a means of investigating mobilities: education, access, 
hardware, code, and AI as boundary objects 
The Matthew effect, or the Matthew effect of accumulated advantage was originally designed to refer 
to the social processes through which various kinds of opportunities for scientific inquiry as well as 
the subsequent symbolic and material rewards for the results of that inquiry tend to accumulate” 
(Merton, 1988) in certain practitioners or organisations of science. Namely that those scientists or 
scientific organisations that have invested in their own development and have gleaned some success 
from those initial investments will accumulate advantage over a course of time. Broadly, the Matthew 
effect is used to describe “the general pattern of self-reinforcing inequality” that can be related to 
economic wealth, political power, influence, educational attainment, or any other desired commodity 
(Perc, 2014). The gaps between those who accumulated advantage (the haves) and those without 
(the have-nots) “widen until dampened by countervailing processes” (Merton 1988), such as 
legislation, educational interventions, or shifts in public sentiment or social mores.  
The Matthew effect also contributes to a number of other concepts in the social sciences, education 
included, that may be broadly characterized as social spirals. These spirals exemplify positive 
feedback loops, in which processes feed upon themselves in such a way as to cause nonlinear 
patterns of growth (Perc 2014). The manifestation of the Matthew effect in education is well 
documented. Stanovich has documented this effect through the impact of early age reading on the 
learning of new skills subsequently, noting that falling behind in reading accumulates a disadvantage 
that proves notably difficult to overcome in later life (2008). Raizada & Kishiyama (2010) further this 
Matthew effect in education by demonstrating the impact of socioeconomic status on brain 
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development and in enabling a lifelong self-reinforcing trend towards self-control and greater 
intellectual discovery. As we investigate the speculative futures of artificial intelligence in education 
towards inclusion, it is critical to consider these feedback loops being created in this educational 
system, and how they represent potentially an exponential acceleration of accumulated advantage.  
The Matthew effect provides utility to a mobilities interpretation of the use of AI in education by 
identifying the material of those mobilities and how that material is increasingly situated in a select 
few. Further, it assists in identifying the boundary objects of these mobilities, Boundary objects are 
“artifacts, documents, terms, concepts, and other forms of reification around which communities of 
practice can organize their interconnections” (Wenger 1998). Positioning AI itself as a boundary 
object both provides analytical utility (Star 1998) and remains true to this original position of 
boundary objects, despite the lessening of agency suggested in its use. With AI, boundary objects 
function as material by which a community can organise their interconnections; with AI, the shift 
from possibility (can organise) to requirement (is organised by) is implied. Star (1998) advanced 
boundary objects as a data structure for artificial intelligence as they are designed to be adaptable 
across multiple viewpoints yet maintain some continuity of identity.  
 
Examples of how this Matthew effect is codified through boundary objects are numerous;  
Merton details the use of intellectual property restrictions as a means of consolidating accumulated 
advantage for scientists (1988), Bothner et al (2010) position the accumulation of junior colleagues in 
academia in much the same way. Merton (1968) discusses admission to the French Academy and its 
artificial limitation of seats (40) as a means of consolidating advantage and status; Yang et al (2015) 
finds evidence of the Matthew effect in the uneven distribution of academicians of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences among different regions and disciplines. Antonelli and Crespi (2013) discussed 
business in the context of discretionary allocation of public R&D subsidies. 
 
Largely what these measures of consolidation collectively represent is a means of manipulating 
mobility: “the aspiring crowd is likely to exhibit particular structural features (beyond large size) and 
associated behaviors that make it harder to cross the status boundary and enter the elite status 
grade—whether that grade is an honorific group of scientists or a band of corporate officers” 
(Piezunka et al 2017). These measures of consolidation exist as opaque and largely inaccessible 
boundary objects, performing a bridging function to the larger community even if the individual 
engaging with them is not. Boundary objects allow different groups to work together without 
consensus (Star 2010) and inform those without advantage as to the contours of the community 
where the accumulated advantage continues to manifest itself (much as is the case with the French 
Academy example and the prestige afforded those with a seat). AI functions in much this same way: 
it allows potentially for greater sophistication in collaborative structure for those within, and reveals 
the boundaries of the community to those without community access. Access to and use of AI signals 
further advantage in community membership.  
 
The Matthew effect extends to the internet itself and the technology used to access it and indeed 
these technologies can and should be seen as boundary objects as they are used by communities to 
organise their interconnections and mobilities within these interconnections. As AI is built from 
these earlier technological infrastructures of desktop and mobile connectivity, and indeed still is 
largely dependent on them, their role as a boundary object remains critical to any speculative future 
of education. Taipale (2016) discusses this in the context of internet access, noting the advantages of 
a mixed fixed/mobile internet connection in stimulating an advantageous, and accumulated, mobility 
conferred in the Finnish context on a largely young, male, and urban population.  
 
The accumulated disadvantage of a lack of technological ownership and consistent use is felt 
disproportionately by certain segments of the larger global population, primarily women, children, 
and broadly those from the Global South: Africa, which has mobile penetration of 82% and internet 
penetration of only 34%; Asia-Pacific with mobile penetration at near 100% and internet penetration 
at 48% (We Are Social, 2018). Globally, women are 12% less likely than men to use the internet 
(ITU 2017). Barriers to internet access and use include cost of devices and data, lack of awareness 
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and understanding of the internet, lack of education, low confidence, lack of digital skills, poor 
literacy, a feeling that the internet is not relevant, concerns around safety and security and lack of 
access to infrastructure, such as quality network coverage and electricity, all of which are 
experienced more acutely than men (GSMA 2018b). Computer home ownership is rare throughout 
most of the world; broadband connectivity even less so. All of these limitations mitigate the 
capacities of these disadvantaged groups to organise their interconnections at a scale and an 
efficiency enjoyed by those without these limitations; as such, the technology itself functions as a 
boundary object. For most of the world, mobile technology is and will remain the ICT of first, and in 
some cases only, use, yet differentiated access within that mobile technological environment 
exacerbates and even accelerates the Matthew effect.  
 
Yet this is not merely a technological access and use issue. Mobile technology carries with it 
significant capacity to shape sociocultural exchanges, as well as acting as the “material symbol of 
one's relational ties” (Gergen 2003). It acts as a social object (Srivastava 2005) rather than merely as 
a technological one and is associated with social relationships both symbolically and functionally; 
further, it provides capacity for and structures the intimacy of these social relationships (Goggin 
2012). As such, the Matthew effect as it applies to mobile technology is not merely the expression of 
a financial, educational, technological or political deficit, but rather a sociocultural one: the lack of 
mobile technology, or the possession of a less advanced mobile technology, or the accompanying 
access issues that governs its use (cellular coverage, cost, literacy or educational capacity, gender 
dynamics, and more) mitigates the possibility of managing networks of social relationships optimally. 
The social self in this position enjoys less advantage, and a relative position within a larger 
sociocultural power dynamic suffers as a result. The performance of sociality within the conduit of 
mobile technology consequently differentiates dramatically: “the types of mobile phones, usage, and 
text messages can become key tools in practices of display and disguise, two strategies underpinning 
the performance of respect” (Pype 2018), tools that provide capacity for increasingly nuanced 
communication at greater price points.  
 
If we are to extend this sociocultural lens in mobile technology to the use of artificial intelligence, we 
see significant limitations in the types of data being generated that can feed into machine learning; 
indeed if data is being generated at all (technological inclusion is particularly pronounced in certain 
regions-South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, e.g.- and amongst particular groups-the gender digital 
divide, in particular) it is limited to particular frames of activity and is limited, often, to particular 
actors within communities. Sinha (2018) and others have pointed to the risks that artificial 
intelligence poses for labour participation for women, but these risks extend beyond financial 
inclusion. The paucity of meaningful data available for machine learning for particular groups in 
particular regions will likely reinforce existing sociocultural barriers to inclusion by rendering 
particular social practices invisible. The accompanying management of social relationships through AI 
presents significant advantage- personalisation, recommendation services, and the general data-
driven automation of one’s social position- yet the disadvantages are rendered largely invisible 
existing as they exist largely outside technological data.  
 
In the frame of artificial intelligence and inclusion, the Matthew effect as expressed in mobile 
technology is particularly problematic precisely due to the intimacy of the technology and its 
relationship and structuring of the social engagements encapsulated therein. This includes the use of 
mobile technology in education and the articulation of the artificial intelligence used within this 
mobile technology. Those with greater technological capacity (emerging from financial and 
educational advantages) carry with them the possibility of greater capacity for making use of AI 
educationally: as a key tool in the performance of social relations for educational effect, in the 
organisation of interconnections and mobilities within these interconnections for educational 
communities, and even in the offloading of educational labour onto AI (in the execution of 
computational educational activities, the completion of administrative duties, in educational 
timetabling and more). Due to its sheer ubiquity and the social intimacy that it structures, mobile 
technology represents the most seamless bridge between human education and artificial intelligence.  
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5G Networks and Complexity and Cost as Barriers to Entry 
Yet this bridge is increasingly laden with barriers that mitigate inclusion. The increasing use of 
artificial intelligence more broadly further illustrates the point, precisely in the types of operating 
infrastructures it requires to prove beneficial. In the space of mobile technology, this is largely the 
purview of 5G networks. 5G networks are illustrative of the intersectionality of accumulated 
advantage and the myriad of ways in which this might express itself educationally. 5G cellular 
networks have built within them access and service provisioning mechanisms unavailable to past 
mobile networks, mechanisms that both increase the potential complexity of mobile networks and 
the scope of the benefits provided therein.  
 
5G networks are also inexorably linked to the future of artificial intelligence for both machine 
learning content (user data, primarily) and the precision required in the execution of AI applications. 
Some AI applications, such as ones with augmented and virtual realities (AR/VR), require extremely 
high connection speeds; 5G networks offer multi-gigabit connections. Many other AI applications 
such as drone surveillance might would require large amounts of data capacity and 5G brings this 
capacity. AI applications will likely require low latency and 5G offers sub-millisecond latency, which is 
more than 10 times quicker than 4G (Sangam 2018). Pragmatically, this potentially involves machine 
learning with unstructured data-a mixture of audio, video, text and numbers that humans process 
routinely-towards the execution of particular tasks: personal assistants distinguishing commands 
from different voices in a household; AI stitching together 3D composites of images taken by drones 
and mobile phones of an emergency response site, to name but two examples.  
 
Technologically, the configurable parameters of 2G nodes were 500, 1000 in 3G networks, 1500 in 
4G networks with 5G networks expected to surpass 2000 (Li et al 2017). The sheer volume of 
configurations made possible with an ever-increasing range of parameters of nodes, along with the 
self-organising features of a 5G network (self-configuration, self-optimization, and self-healing), 
present a complexity that many without sufficient resources will not be able to enjoy. 5G networks 
adjust the bandwidth of the data transmission to the variable user density and the speed of their 
movements, yet due to the limited storage and processing capacity of the mobile devices themselves 
(as opposed to the 5G mobile network as a whole), the processing and storage of internet queries 
and activities takes place in cloud computing systems (Khetselius et al 2017), thereby adding an 
additional layer of complexity (exchanges between the device, the internet, and the cloud storage 
and processing centers) and cost (bandwidth, cloud storage, and more).  
 
Artificial intelligence would ‘live’ in the complexity of this cloud architecture, providing measures of 
intelligent automation, predictive analytics, and proactive interventions, ultimately moving towards 
autonomous systems that “understand, learn, predict, adopt and operate autonomously and give rise 
to a spectrum of intelligent implementation” (Khetselius et al 2017). The sheer complexity of such a 
system and the possibility, if not probability, of autonomous systems operating within it present 
considerable challenges to those operating on the deficit end of the Matthew effect.  
 
The economic barriers to entry to 5G networks are sufficient in and of themselves to prohibit 
mobility through them. The rollout of 5G networks in Europe alone is expected to account for €57 
billion by 2020. This prohibitive cost of entry is merely the first of two time markers on a larger 
Matthew effect; the potential benefits (estimated in the EU at €113 billion by 2025) are thereby lost 
by this barrier to entry to the 5G environment (Mansell 2017), benefits that are likely funneled into 
further research and development. Further are political considerations as the benefits of investments 
in 5G networks require concerted and elongated effort, likely across several political regimes; 
advantages exist in regional cohesion to offset costs and increase the saturation in 5G networks. The 
5G Infrastructure Public Private Partnership (5G PPP 2014) is an example of just such a coordinated 
regional response: 5G PPP is a joint initiative between the European Commission and European ICT 
industry (ICT manufacturers, telecommunications operators, service providers, SMEs and researcher 
Institutions) to research and accelerate the adoption of a 5G infrastructure. Such a coordinated, 
interdisciplinary and regional response is unavailable to many.  
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It is likely that in some sectors, the advent of 5G mobile networks will exacerbate the digital divide, 
despite technological innovations such as free-space optical links and solar-powered equipment in 
offsetting the cost and skills needed to deploy 5G networks (Lavery et al 2018). The “material 
inequalities in the distribution of communication technologies” (Chouliaraki 2012) is a highly 
intersectional enterprise with potential immobilities presented at each layer of the intersection. It is 
through this intersectional 5G enterprise that much of the world will interact with or be interacted 
on by artificial intelligence and will do so in increasingly reduced timeframes: “it took less than 30 
years to successfully transform cellular networks from pure telephony systems to networks that can 
transport rich multimedia content and have a profound impact on our daily life.” (Liu 2018) and 
presumably less time for the same to happen with the AI that will increasingly impact our lives 
through 5G networks.  
The Emerging Divide: AI and Educational Curricula 
Yet the digital divide and its spillover effects on inclusion is never exclusively a digital enterprise; as 
many have posited, it extends well beyond mere technological ownership and extends well into the 
values and outcomes encoded into education and associated curricula. What the digital suggests in 
this instance, particularly in the use of artificial intelligence across mobile networks, is both the sheer 
ubiquity of such an enterprise (in respect to mobile ownership rates worldwide) and the 
acceleration of deficits generated in such ubiquity: the intersection of AI, 5G networks, and a 
supporting educational infrastructure to supply expertise to such an endeavor is available to a very 
select few. 
 
This very select few has entrenched this accumulated advantage presented by AI and its use in 5G 
networks by a structuring of the underlying data on which AI depends. The US, the European Union, 
and China are aligning policy with other intersectional factors, such as education, infrastructure, and 
more, to develop data-based economies of scale and in doing so have created three distinct data 
realms with different approaches to data governance (Aaronson and Leblond 2018). These data 
realms act as accelerants to the digital divide: those without the means for scale and differentiation 
(to act independently as a data regime) must spend resources in compliance towards these three 
regimes.  
 
These data regimes, along with the current negative uses of data that have the potential to 
accelerate with AI (surveillance, reinforcement of monopolies, loss of privacy, and algorithmic 
profiling, all of which are likely to disproportionately affect those without means), present a data 
injustice (Heeks and Renken 2018) in that there is a lack of fairness in the way people are made 
visible, represented, and treated as a result of their production of digital data (Taylor 2017). Artificial 
intelligence has the capacity to accelerate these injustices by (further) abstracting the relationship 
between private power and public accountability (Joh 2018). As AI emerged largely from the private 
sector and mobilises through largely private 5G networks operating on slices of the auctioned 
mobile spectrum, public accountability becomes a convoluted intersectional affair. The potential for 
injustice and the increase of the digital divide is probable.  
 
All of this carries with it profound challenges to existing educational systems and measures taken to 
improve inclusion; indeed these challenges are encoded in them. Accumulated advantage is not only 
a dichotomy between those with access to these sophisticated technologies and those that do not 
enjoy that same privilege. A further parallel is between the “curriculum” of artificial intelligence for 
learning in 5G networks as outlined in Li et al (2017) and traditional and human-centred educational 
curricula that is being increasingly redrawn as a reductionist enterprise aligned with national and 
international quantitative metrics. AI has evolved to include multidisciplinary techniques such as 
machine learning, optimization theory, game theory, control theory, and meta-heuristics, and various 
pedagogical applications of these theories in machine learning, unsupervised learning, and 
reinforcement learning (2017).  
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Unsupervised machine learning, in particular, bears resemblance to adaptive learning and self-efficacy 
learning programmes in humans. Unsupervised machine learning exists as a measure of learning 
consolidation, relying on the AI itself to find the embedded patterns in its own input, rather than 
through the direction of a secondary instructional agent (2017). It exists as a measure of formative 
assessment whereby the learner (ie, the AI) identifies hidden patterns in its input and identifies 
strategies for consolidating these patterns in future activities. Rather than using AI as a channel for 
formative assessment for human students in a host of potential instructional roles such as peers, 
team members, game players, coworkers, teachers (Graesser and McDaniel 2017) and through 
ongoing  “stealth” assessment strategies-a game-based assessment framework which links observed 
behavior with evolving competencies (Min et al 2017), AI uses unsupervised learning as formative 
assessment for itself. “In the field of AI, unsupervised learning is applied to estimate the hidden layer 
parameters in neural networks and plays an important role in deep learning methods” and it is the 
most widely used AI category in mobile (cellular) networks (Li et al 2017). The AI that emerges from 
the curricula of 5G networks and winds into educational spaces will be one that has largely learnt 
from itself, without direct instruction from human agents. The impact of these techno-educational 
configurations and their development outside human environments on educational inclusion is 
potentially significant: curricula, pedagogy, assessments, evaluations, behavioral metrics, and an 
alignment of educational practice with linear (and predictable) activity.   
 
Traditional educational curricula designed for humans is increasingly influenced by third party 
commercial enterprises designed to largely simplify the messiness of the educational experience. The 
commodification of learning, redrawn increasingly as a commercial enterprise, has impacted 
curriculum development, seeing it in the much the same way as policy development: “a linear 
succession of events (formulation, implementation, evaluation) rather than as a complex, messy and 
iterative process” (Whitty 2017). This shifting of education towards predictable evaluation and 
evidence-based policy paradigms, largely attempts to tidy the messiness, have increased private-
sector participation in education largely through the use of technology (Riep 2017). This alignment of 
commercial and educational objectives, and its subsequent impact on educational curricula is born 
most heavily on those laboring under an accumulated disadvantage.  
 
Education is largely being redrawn as a reductionist enterprise as curricula is being aligned to largely 
derivative computational models of learning (Azhar 2016). It is an education that is designed to 
provide skills associated with an unbundled labour market: task decomposition, task completion, 
moments of labour in small gaps in time (Teevan 2016), largely a predictable and granular approach 
to education. Education is increasingly attempting to recreate the computation practices at work in 
the technology sector and repurpose them into pedagogical employ (discussed in Gallagher 2019).  
 
Examples abound. Bridge International Academies, particularly active and contentious in India, 
Uganda, Liberia, and Kenya, use technologies and a highly formalised curriculum “to construct mass 
markets for low-cost schooling, including GPS devices that map low-income communities, 
smartphones that automate administrative functions, and computer devices that perform the duties 
of a teacher” (Riep 2017). As Riep details, Bridge International Academies take this turn towards 
computational thinking towards a new power dynamic through the use of “teacher-computers”, 
which are tablet e-readers that convey ‘ … step-by-step instructions explaining what teachers should 
do and say during any given moment of a class’ (BIA 2016); as of 2018, the significant emphasis on 
tablets as “teacher-computers” has been replaced with tablets as “teacher guides” (BIA 2018) yet 
the flow from computer to teacher to student remains, what Riep refers to as a type of techagogy, a 
technology-directed form of pedagogy in which instruction is led by machines. While increasingly 
contentious and in some instances ending its operations (in Uganda, detailed in McVeigh and Lyons, 
2017), Bridge International Academies is merely representative of this drive towards techagogy; the 
political realignment of the teacher servicing the instructions of the computer is merely a further 
element of a larger intersectionality that potentially accelerates the Matthew effect.  
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The curriculum associated with the machine learning of artificial learning is suffering from no such 
reductionism: as discussed, machine learning, optimization theory, game theory, control theory, 
meta-heuristics, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning (Liu et al 2017) all are employed 
to develop AI in 5G networks. It is a curriculum growing in dynamic complexity to service an 
increasingly complex field; human-centred education in contrast is increasingly reduced to align with 
measures designed to increased predictable outcomes.  
 
Ultimately, the question that can conceivably be asked in such a scenario is whether the curriculum 
of artificial intelligence in 5G networks pedagogically surpasses that of traditional educational 
curricula, particularly in regions where education is increasingly mediated through third party 
providers and computational curricula, such as initiatives like Bridge International Academies. As 
more and more education is engaged through a larger and increasingly commercial educational 
technology enterprise and more and more of that education is driven by an artificial intelligence 
emerging from curricula of greater and greater sophistication, a situation emerges that poses great 
challenges for educational inclusion, particularly for those that largely sit outside the advantageous 
intersections of education and technology.  
Rethinking Equitable Futures of Inclusion 
Returning to the potential acceleration of the Matthew effect in light of the technological 
sophistication inherent to artificial intelligence, 5G networks, and increasingly dynamic (for AI) and 
deterministic (for humans) educational curricula, we pause to consider offsets to this seemingly 
inevitable accumulation of advantage, what Piezunka et al (2017) refer to as external judges which 
seek to limit the operation of the Matthew effect. These external judges might include social unrest 
or outage (Bebchuk 2009), policy and legislation, ethical frameworks, and educational curricula, all of 
which have spillover effects on inclusion.  
 
As the subject of this chapter is the use of AI in education for inclusion, what follows will cleave to 
this subject, but it bears mentioning that the weight of non-educational external judges (policy, 
legislation, data protection, possible outrage over surveillance, and transparency) will more greatly 
impact the shape of the the marriage of AI and inclusion than the curriculum used to engage it. 
However, a curricular focus is significant in that it is largely a codification of entrenched values and 
advantages (the curriculum as political barometer of what is) and an aspirational endeavor (as a 
measure of what it could be). As such, the use of AI in education requires potential offsets to the 
Matthew effect that will likely emerge as a result, particularly for those traditionally disadvantaged 
groups which inclusion has attempted to serve. These offsets are presented by Dignum (2017) as AI 
development principles: 
 
“Accountability: an AI system needs to to be able to justify its own decisions based on the 
algorithms and the data used by it. We have to equip AI systems with the moral values and 
societal norms that are used in the context in which these systems operate; Responsibility: 
although AI systems are autonomous, their decisions should be linked to all the stakeholders 
who contributed in developing them: manufacturers, developers, users and owners. All of 
them will be responsible for the system’s behaviour; Transparency: users need to be able to 
inspect and verify the algorithms and data used by the system to make and implement 
decisions.” (2017).  
 
Educational institutions that seek to employ AI are further stakeholders in this process, beholden to 
the same measures of accountability, responsibility, and transparency that Dignum presents here, 
measures that are increasingly at odds with the data that AI learns from.  
 
As with all data-driven technologies, the underlying data that the AI learns from is sensitive to 
discrimination and bias (Caliskan et al 2017), a point of particular concern for inclusion. Decisions 
emerging from AI are assumed, incorrectly, to be emerging from fair and unbiased computations and 
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are less likely to be questioned as biased than those from human agents (The AI Now Report, 2016), 
a position that proves particularly problematic for educational organisations engaged in inclusion, 
ones that will largely lack the expertise to unpick the biases emerging from AI engaged in ongoing 
educational work. AI in these spaces will largely be emerging from commercial enterprises and will 
largely encode the biases and discrimination at work in these commercial spaces (Miller et al 2018). 
Data used to train AI for employ in educational inclusion efforts will likely be drawn from broader 
sectors of society than just educational inclusion programmes. Broader datasets will likely reinforce 
the biases emerging from society as a whole, including biases that largely disadvantages students in 
inclusion programmes, an “unequal opportunity virus” (2018) coursing through the larger AI 
apparatus of machines, learning, and educational work.  
 
As with all data-driven technologies, the AI will learn from the mobile data that what counts is what 
is counted, and what has happened will structure what will happen, learning that runs counter to the 
ideas of equitable educational inclusion. This learning serves to potentially neglect underrepresented 
groups and reinforce the barriers that made them largely underrepresented in the first instance. It is 
conceivable that AI that equitably services those in inclusion programmes will need to learn from 
data and neural networks emerging from these inclusion programmes themselves. This data and 
these neural networks operate on a different data-driven reality where inclusion is a stated objective 
of the educational enterprise, and not a statistical outlier in a broader societal dataset. Fidelity to 
Dignam’s (2017) measures of accountability, responsibility, and transparency begin here in the 
selection of data that drives the learning of AI; too broad a data scope disadvantages those that 
would otherwise function computationally as outliers, students in inclusion programmes included.  
 
Transparency demands that much of this work is surfaced in both human educational curricula, as a 
critical data education; and in AI curricula, as both surfacing the biases in the data driving machine 
learning and the employ of an external judge to mitigate these biases, perhaps by way of coding for 
equitable outcomes or external review. These external judges need to be structural directives, 
embedded into the machine learning curricula itself, and not merely post-facto compliance 
mechanisms. The sheer accelerating volume of mobile generated data and the primacy of its use in 
machine learning for future artificial intelligence makes this transparency problematic, however. 
Whether this sort of transparency is a probable, or even possible, future for the use of AI in 
educational inclusion remains to be seen, yet the potential acceleration of the Matthew effect in this 
context is clear as is the increased interdependence of mobile technology and artificial intelligence.  
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